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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY IN
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS IN LOUISIANA
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides a
criminal defendant with the right to a preliminary examina-
tion in felony cases if no grand jury indictment has been
returned.1 Traditionally, hearsay and other informal modes of
proof were inadmissible at a preliminary examination;2 how-
ever, recently the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs in a
case in which the trial judge based a finding of probable cause
in a preliminary examination solely on hearsay and other
normally inadmissible statements. 3 The court's refusal to
consider the case raises the question of whether hearsay and
other informal modes of proof are now admissible at a pre-
liminary examination.
Prior to the 1974 Louisiana constitution, article 292 of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure gave a criminal defen-
dant the right to a preliminary examination in felony cases
"before the finding of an indictment or the filing of an infor-
mation .... -4 Article I, § 14, of the new constitution not only
guarantees this right but also impliedly modifies article 292
by eliminating the district attorney's power to circumvent a
defendant's right by simply filing a bill of information. 5 Un-
less a grand jury has indicted him, the defendant is entitled
to a preliminary examination. The transcripts of the Con-
stitutional Convention debates reveal that this protective
limitation was the only intended change from prior law.6
1. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 292.
2. The writer's research revealed no cases in which the Louisiana Sup-
reme Court stated that the hearsay rule was inapplicable to preliminary
examinations. See also The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1974-1975 Term-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 533, 544
(1976).
3. State v. Perkins, 316 So. 2d 385 (La. 1975). The accused's prior criminal
record was introduced without the defendant ever taking the stand. Also
reference was made by the state to normally inadmissible polygraph evi-
dence.
4. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 292 prior to its amendment by La. Acts 1974,
Ex. Sess. No. 16, § 1.
5. LA. CONST. art. I, § 14: "The right to a preliminary examination shall
not be denied in felony cases except when the accused is indicted by a grand
jury."
6. STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM
TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 14, 1973 at 20-31 [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. Id.
at 27, where Mr. Burson remarked: "After the finding of an indictment or the
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Therefore, the type of preliminary examination provided in
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, and the eviden-
tiary rules applicable thereto, were unaltered by the new
constitution.
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides for a
"full-blown" preliminary examination,7 the purpose of which
is to determine if probable cause exists to hold the, defendant,
to determine if the defendant is entitled to bail and in what'
amount, and finally, to perpetuate testimony." The defendant
is entitled to counsel,9 has the right to have the witnesses
produced against him examined in his presence, and has the
right to confront and to cross-examine the witnesses pro-
duced against him.' 0 Furthermore, the Code provides that a
transcript of the testimony be made and perpetuated for pos-
sible use in a subsequent judicial proceeding.1
The extensive adversarial proceeding formulated in the
Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate the admis-
filing of an information, Article 292 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Proce-
dure says that, 'an order for a preliminary examination in felony cases may
be granted by the court at any time either on its own motion or on request of
the state or of the defendant.' The intent of this amendment is not designed,
and I want to make the record clear on that point, to add to or subtract from
the right to a preliminary examination in any case but one, and that would
be the case where the district attorney has elected to go by route of filing a
Bill of Information" (emphasis added). Obviously the redactors recognized
that they were working with the present statutory guidelines in LA. CODE
CRIM. P. arts. 291-98. Additionally, at the time of the convention the redactors
had before them Pugh v. Rainwater, in which the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held unconstitutional a discretionary system in which the district
attorney could file an information and obviate the necessity of having a
preliminary examination, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1974). See The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Louisiana Constitutional
Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 533, 544-46 (1976).
7. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 293-95 gives the criminal defendant extensive
rights in this proceeding. See also Comment, The Constitutional Right to a
Preliminary Hearing in Louisiana, 35 LA. L. REV. 813, 814 (1975).
8. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 296.
9. Id. art. 293.
10. Id. art. 294, comment (a) indicates that the redactors felt, based on
the early Louisiana Supreme Court decision of State v. Chambers, 44 La. Ann.
603, 10 So. 886 (1892), that the constitutionally guaranteed right of confronta-
tion was applicable in preliminary examinations. Of course at the time the
Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted in 1966 the right of confrontation
was guaranteed by La. Const. art. I, § 9 (1921). LA. CONST. art. I, § 16 did not
alter this concept. See PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 7 at 94-115.
11. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 294.
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sibility of hearsay. 12 Although the Louisiana jurisprudence
clearly evidences many exceptions to the general prohibition
against hearsay, 13 none of the cases intimate that the hear-
say rule itself is inapplicable in preliminary examinations.
Moreover, the right of confrontation traditionally has man-
dated that hearsay is not admissible against a criminal de-
fendant. 4 For example, in a series of cases beginning with
Pointer v. Texas' 5 the United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that the right of confrontation and the general pro-
hibition against hearsay protect similar values. 6 The major
12. LA. R.S. 15:434 (1950) provides: "Hearsay evidence is inadmissible,
except as otherwise provided in this Code." The right of confrontation and
social policy also weigh heavily against the admissibility of hearsay at the
preliminary examination. For other jurisdictions that utilize formal eviden-
tiary rules at the preliminary exam, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. 22-211 (1956); CAL.
EVID. CODE 300 (1966); People v. Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d 472 (1953);
People v. Weiss, 147 Misc. 595, 261 N.Y.S. 646 (Magis. Ct. 1932); Wolke v.
Fleming, 24 Wis. 2d 606, 129 N.W.2d 841 (1964). See also The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Louisiana Constitutional
Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 533, 544 (1976).
13. E.g., State v. Guin, 212 La. 475, 30 So. 2d 895 (1947) (admissions); State
v. Kelly, 237 La. 956, 112 So. 2d 674 (1959) (business records); Campbell v.
American Home Assur. Co., 260 La. 1047, 258 So. 2d 81 (1972) (declarations
against interest); State v. Banks, 111 La. 22, 35 So. 370 (1903) (reported
testimony); State v. Black, 42 La. Ann. 861, 8 So. 594, (1890) (dying declara-
tions); State v. Smith, 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973) (excited utterances and
present sense impressions as part of the res gestae). See generally G. PUGH,
LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 387-527 (1974).
14. Comment, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1965). "'Con-
front' connates a more active participation by the defendant with the witnesses
and thus .can reasonably be read as including an opportunity to cross-
examine. 'Witnesses' similarly must mean the declarants, rather than any
witnesses who recount what the declarants or original documents said. If the
sixth amendment were construed not to require the production of the declar-
ant of the damaging statement, the accused's right of cross-examination
would then be emasculated." Id. at 743.
15. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
16. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In addition to these
cases several other decisions recognize that hearsay problems are to an
extent constitutional problems. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250
(1969); Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1968); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S.
293 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363
(1966); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1965). See also Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S.
129 (1968); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). However, since 1970, the
United Supreme Court has stated that there is not perfect congruence be-
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reason for the existence of the right of confrontation, as the
Court viewed it, is to give the defendant the right to cross-
examine the witnesses against him, unless one of the recog-
nized hearsay exceptions applied. 17 The Louisiana courts
have generally followed this trend and have prohibited the
use of hearsay against a criminal defendant unless the evi-
dence falls into one of the recognized hearsay exceptions.'
8
From a policy standpoint, hearsay should be inadmissible
at a preliminary examination. The basic objection to hearsay
evidence is its potential unreliability,' 9 and because of this,
the binding over for trial of an accused on hearsay evidence
alone seems unfair and repugnant to our concepts of substan-
tial justice.20 If hearsay is used to establish probable cause at
a preliminary examination, an accused may be deprived of his
liberty for a substantial period of time based on potentially
unreliable evidence; 21 he will be subjected to the anxiety and
hazardous uncertainty of a criminal trial; and finally, he will
be put to considerable expense to defend himself.22 In addi-
tion to these immediate consequences, the accused's reputa-
tion will be harmed irreparably, even if he is subsequently
acquitted. The only justification for admitting hearsay in a
preliminary examination is society's significant interest in
detaining one who is probably guilty. However, the disallow-
ance of hearsay does not necessarily facilitate escape of the
guilty since other evidence of guilt should be available, and
even if it is not, the discharge from custody of a defendant
after no finding of probable cause does not preclude the dis-
tween the hearsay and confrontation rules, although they do protect similar
values. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80-86 (1970); California v. Green, 99
U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
17. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
18. E.g., State v. Washington, 261 La. 808, 261 So. 2d 224 (1972); State v.
Holmes, 258 La. 221, 245 So. 2d 707 (1971); State v. Wright, 254 La. 521, 225 So.
2d 201 (1969).
19. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 245 at 581 (1972).
20. Cf., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951). In the context of a disloyalty trial, Justice Douglas, concurring, indi-
cated that courts should be very careful to insure the defendant a fair trial
before eliminating the public trust and confidence in him by pronouncing his
disloyalty. Id. at 180.
21. E.g., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
22. Additionally, it is to the state's financial advantage to see to it that
unsubstantiated charges are not prolonged indefinitedly.
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trict attorney from rearresting the accused when additional,
competent evidence is available. 23 The prohibition against
hearsay at a preliminary examination furthers reliability and
has a desirable social effect in a society committed to the
ideal that only the guilty should be imprisoned.
How then should Louisiana courts handle the following
situation? A police officer takes the stand at a preliminary
examination and relates hearsay and "double hearsay ' 24 in
order to establish probable cause to hold the accused for the
charge involved. The state produces no competent evidence of
the defendant's guilt. In such a situation hearsay testimony
should be inadmissible, and unless other competent evidence
is presented, the accused should be discharged pursuant to
Code of Criminal Procedure article 296.25 Yet in an identical
factual situation the trial court in the recent case of State v.
Perkins26 reached an opposite result and not only allowed
hearsay into evidence, but acknowledged that it was "plowing
new ground today ' 27 in admitting hearsay evidence at a pre-
liminary examination. 2s The defendant applied to the
Louisiana Supreme Court for supervisory writs of review, but
the court denied writs.29
Perhaps this questionable writ-denial can be understood
by an examination of the recent decision of Gerstein v.
Pugh,30 in which the United States Supreme Court held that
the fourth amendment entitles a criminal defendant to a judi-
cial determination of probable cause, irrespective of the of-
23. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 296, comment (c). However, since the 1974
constitution, unless probable cause is established against the defendant at a
preliminary examination, he cannot be brought to trial unless indicted by a
grand jury. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 14; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 296.
24. Double hearsay simply means that the witness stated (for the truth
of the matter asserted) not simply what another has related to him, but what
was related to another via a third party and then related to the witness by
the intermediary party. For example, an officer on the stand gives testimony
(asserted for the truth of the matter) concerning information obtained from
Mr. X, who stated he obtained his information from Mr. Y.
25. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 296.
26. State v. Perkins, Crim. No. 55, 941 (19th Jud. Dist., filed March 14,
1975).
27. State v. Perkins, 316 So. 2d 385, 388 (La. 1975) (Barham, J., dissent-
ing). The trial court record is appendixed to the opinion at 388.
28. Id.
29. State v. Perkins, 316 So. 2d 385 (La. 1975).
30. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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fense charged, as a prerequisite to continued detention when
no arrest warrant has been obtained. 31 The Court in Gerstein
made it clear that it did not consider this "first appearance"
hearing a "critical stage '32 of the prosecution, but rather
likened the determination of probable cause to obtaining an
arrest warrant.33 Consequently, the court stated that con-
stitutionally, the proceeding need not even be of an adversary
nature and moreover, that informal modes of proof such as
written testimony and hearsay could be admissible.3 4
Although Louisiana once provided statutorily for such a
"first appearance" hearing, in the 1928 Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 35 it had fallen into such disuse that the redactors of
the 1966 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure discontinued
it and substituted in its place a booking procedure. 36 In Gers-
tein, the Supreme Court stated that such a booking procedure
does not meet the requirements of the fourth amendment,
which requires a "first appearance" hearing as a prerequisite
to any further restraint of the criminal defendant's liberty
when no arrest warrant has been obtained.3 7 Under the pre-
cise circumstances of Gerstein, a criminal defendant has a
31. Id. at 126.
32. "Critical stage" is the label the Supreme Court attaches to any pre-
trial procedure in which a defense on the merits would be impaired if the
accused were required to proceed without counsel. See Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967).
33. 420 U.S. at 120.
34. Id. at 122. The Court intimated that the proceeding could even be ex
parte. Id. However, LA. CONST. Art. I, § 13 provides that the accused is
entitled to counsel at each stage of the proceedings against him, which
indicates that in Louisiana the accused's rights at a Gerstein type hearing
are broader than required by the fourth amendment.
35. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 79-82 (1928). Similar to the Gerstein hearing,
the criminal defendant arrested without a warrant was to be brought before
the judge without unnecessary delay and, "unless an affidavit be then made
setting forth the charge against the prisoner," the judge was to "order him
forthwith to be discharged from custody." Id. art. 81.
36. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 228-29 provide that once a person is arrested,
he should be taken promptly to the nearest jail or police station, where he is
to be booked. The booking officer must inform the prisoner of the charge
against him, and of his rights to counsel and to a preliminary examination. In
1972, the legislature added article 230.1 (La. Acts 1972, No. 700, § 1), which
provides that a criminal defendant must be brought before a judge within 144
hours from the time he is taken into custody for the appointment of counsel
and, at the judge's discretion, consideration of bail. However, there is no
probable cause determination at this stage or at the booking stage.
37. 420 U.S. at 126.
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federal constitutional right to a hearing irrespective of
whether a state provides one by statute.
In effect, what the trial court did in Perskins was to hold
a preliminary examination "a la Gerstein," even though the
Code of Criminal Procedure, recently constitutionally re-
affirmed, 38 provides for a more extensive adversarial pro-
ceeding "of right. ' 39 Whether the two proceedings can be
combined effectively and whether to do so is constitutionally
proper, is questionable. 40 The two procedures simply are not
coextensive. The Gerstein "first appearance" hearing is "of
right" irrespective of the offense charged;4 1 in Louisiana the
right to a preliminary examination exists only in felony
cases. 42 The Gerstein hearing is a constitutional prerequisite
to continued detention; 43 in Louisiana continued detention is
immaterial to a defendant's right to a preliminary examina-
tion.44 The right to a Gerstein hearing exists only absent an
arrest warrant; 45 presence of an arrest warrant is immaterial
with respect to the defendant's right to a preliminary exami-
nation in Louisiana. 46 Whether a defendant has been indicted
by a grand jury is immaterial with respect to the Gerstein
type hearing; 47 in Louisiana the defendant does not have the
right to a preliminary examination if he has been indicted by
a grand jury.48 Moreover, the court in Gerstein made it clear
that to implement effectively the accused's fourth amend-
ment rights, the hearing must be held promptly after ar-
rest;49 contrariwise, the Louisiana procedure fixes no time
limit since its purpose is not directed toward a prerequisite to
continued detention. 50
38. LA. CONST. art. I, § 14; PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 14 at 20-31.
39. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 291-96.
40. When Article I, § 14 was approved, the redactors of the 1974
Louisiana constitution had in mind only the proceeding established by arts.
291-98; PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 14 at 20-31. Furthermore, the Gerstein decision
had not yet been handed down. Therefore, it would be improper to simply
substitute the "first appearance" hearing for the one presently provided in
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
41. 420 U.S. at 126.
42. LA. CONST. art. I, § 14; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 292.
43. 420 U.S. at 126.
44. LA. CONST. art. I, § 14; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 292.
45. 420 U.S. at 126.
46. LA. CONST. art. I, § 14; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 292.
47. 420 U.S. at 126.
48. LA. CONST. art. I, § 14; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 292.
49. 420 U.S. at 125.
50. The extensive adversarial hearing provided for in Louisiana could
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The state legislature certainly has authority to provide
for a "first appearance" hearing to supplement the present
procedure outlined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 51 How-
ever, until such action is taken by the legislature, Louisiana
courts should enforce the present statutory scheme, recently
constitutionally reaffirmed. 52 Since a writ denial is not a rul-
ing on the matter, when the issue is again presented, hope-
fully the Louisiana Supreme Court will clarify a criminal
defendant's rights by recognizing that only competent evi-
dence should be admissible at a preliminary examination in
Louisiana.
Pete Lewis
THE ATTORNEY AND CONTEMPT: How CAN HE ADVISE HIS
CLIENT?
In Maness v. Meyers,' the United States Supreme Court
confronted the question of whether an attorney can, without
risking a contempt citation, advise his client to disobey a
court's order to produce evidence, when the attorney's advice
is based on his good faith belief that the client is protected by
the fifth amendment from disclosure of that evidence. The
attorney's client had been served, during a civil trial,2 with a
not except in rare instances be held soon enough to satisfy the promptness
required by Gerstein, due to the need to allow the defendant time to procure
counsel and time to prepare for the hearing. The court in Gerstein recognized
that the more extensive the procedure was, the more difficult it would be to
comply with the decision and suggested that some existing procedures would
have to be accelerated and others modified. '120 U.S. at 120, 124.
51. At present the Louisiana State Law Institute has under study a
proposal that would allow the finding of probable cause to be based in whole
or in part on hearsay (proposed art. 299) with a corollary amendment to art.
295 that would permit a motion to strike prior recorded hearsay testimony
when the transcript is to be introduced at trial. This would be an attempt to
legislatively effectuate our present statutory scheme into a Gerstein type
hearing; however, it would constitute a major departure from the redactors'
intended meaning of LA. CONST. art. I, § 14, and would not solve the problems
in trying to combine the two proceedings.
52. See authorities in note 38, supra.
1. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
2. Although the trial was referred to as a civil one, the proceeding was
criminal in nature since it was initiated under Article 527 of the Texas Penal
Code, which regulates the distribution of obscene materials. The article pro-
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